![]() Imagine a world in which scientists were completely honest when writing up and submitting their papers for publication. This does not alter our adherence to PLOS ONE policies on sharing data and materials. The funders had no role in any aspects of this study, the preparation of the manuscript, or the decision to publish.Ĭompeting interests: We note that Simine Vazire is a member of the PLOS Board of Directors and that Leonid Tiokhin and Daniel Lakens are co-founders of Red Team Market. KZ was supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) grant SES 1254291. The minimal data set for this paper consists solely of mathematical equations, which can be found in the manuscript and supplementary materials.įunding: LT and DL were supported by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) VIDI grant 452-17-01. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.ĭata Availability: No data was generated or analyzed for the current study. Received: JAccepted: JanuPublished: February 23, 2021Ĭopyright: © 2021 Tiokhin et al. PLoS ONE 16(2):Įditor: Wing Suen, University of Hong Kong, HONG KONG Our models provide simple, powerful tools for understanding how to promote honest paper submission in academic publishing.Ĭitation: Tiokhin L, Panchanathan K, Lakens D, Vazire S, Morgan T, Zollman K (2021) Honest signaling in academic publishing. Counterintuitively, our analysis implies that inefficiencies in academic publishing (e.g., arbitrary formatting requirements, long review times) can serve a function by disincentivizing scientists from submitting low-quality work to high-ranking journals. ![]() Without submission costs, scientists benefit from submitting all papers to high-ranking journals, unless papers can only be submitted a limited number of times. Our models demonstrate that several mechanisms can ensure honest journal submission, including differential benefits, differential costs, and costs to resubmitting rejected papers. How can honesty be ensured, despite incentives for deception? Here, we address this question by applying the theory of honest signaling to the publication process. Yet, information asymmetries and conflicts of interests incentivize scientists to deceive journals about the quality of their research. ![]() Academic journals provide a key quality-control mechanism in science. ![]()
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